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RATIFICATION OF REAPPORTIONMENT PLANS
DRAWN BY REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS
Poonam Kumar*
Partisan gerrymandering is a danger that threatens the foundations of the Ameri-
can democratic structure. This Note argues that partisan gerrymandering must be
eliminated in order to foster political competition and ensure government account-
ability. Without a judicial solution, redistricting commissions present a viable
option to help cure the ills of partisan gerrymandering. This Note argues that
automatic and mandatory state supreme court judicial review must be the process
by which the redistricting plans drawn by these commissions are ratified. Auto-
matic judicial review permits redistricting to remain a legislative task while giving
the judiciary a quintessential judicial task. In addition, this Note argues that
automatic state supreme court review of the reapportionment plans provides a
fairer and more efficient ratification mechanism that can greatly influence the ef-
fectiveness of redistricting commissions in combating partisan gerrymandering.
INTRODUCTION
During the Federal Convention of 1787, James Madison de-
clared that "[w]henever the State Legislatures had a favorite
measure to carry, they would take care so to mould their regula-
tions as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed."' Madison
foresaw a controversy that continues to plague the American elec-
toral system: partisan gerrymandering. Although partisan
gerrymandering has been a consistent source of debate over the
past three centuries, the discussion has intensified in the twenty
years since the Supreme Court held partisan gerrymandering to be
ajusticiable claim.3
Many solutions have been offered to resolve the challenge of
partisan gerrymandering. One proposed resolution is creating re-
districting commissions to draw state and federal congressional
district lines to help diminish the presence of partisan influences.
* University of Michigan Law School, J.D. expected 2007; Brown University, A.B.
2003. The author would like to thank the Michigan Election Law Project and Professor Ellen
Katz for encouraging the author's interest in the field of voting rights.
1. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 240-241 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
2. See infra Part I.
3. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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This Note argues that any redistricting commission must be ratified
by automatic state supreme court review.
Part I of this Note discusses recent judicial decisions regarding
partisan gerrymandering and its attendant dangers to the political
process, including a dramatic decrease in competition and gov-
ernment accountability. Part II describes the recent nationwide
wave of legislation creating redistricting commissions. Part III ar-
gues that automatic judicial review by a state's supreme court is the
only process by which to ratify a redistricting plan devised by a re-
districting commission, and suggests that a ratification mechanism
involving legislative or gubernatorial approval only increases the
ability of partisan influences to pervade the reapportionment
process. Furthermore, redistricting commissions without a ratifica-
tion process subject the state to high financial costs and election
delays. This Note argues that automatic judicial review by a state's
supreme court provides the most efficient and fair mechanism for
ratification because it respects the institutional competence of the
judiciary and reduces partisan influences on the redistricting proc-
ess, while ensuring timely elections pursuant to a constitutional
and legal redistricting plan. Although automatic judicial review
would not eliminate all partisan influences from the redistricting
process, this procedure is an indispensable check on any redistrict-
ing commission.
I. THE DEFINITION AND POLITICAL DANGERS
OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
"Political gerrymanders are not new to the American scene. One
scholar traces them back to the [c] olony of Pennsylvania at the be-
ginning of the 18th century[.]"' Political gerrymandering is
defined as the majority party apportionment of electoral districts in
order to "gain power which [is] not proportionate to its numerical
strength."6 Today, partisan gerrymandering continues to greatly
4. The phrase "ratification" will be used to refer to the process by which a redistrict-
ing plan becomes final. There are two principal categories of ratification processes,
including executive and legislative veto and automatic state supreme court review. In addi-
tion, some redistricting commissions lack any ratification process.
5. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 274.
6. Id. at 274-75 (quoting ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
GERRYMANDER 26-28 (1974)). The term gerrymander derives from a combination of the
name of Massachusetts governor Elbridge Gerry, who in 1812 created an election district
resembling a salamander, and the word "salamander." Id. Black's Law Dictionary defines
gerrymandering as "[t]he practice of dividing a geographic area into electoral districts,
often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting
the opposition's voting strength." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 708 (8th ed. 2004).
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influence decennial redistricting.7 By giving legislators the author-
ity to create districts as they wish, political redistricting provides the
legislators with almost exclusive control over the electoral process,
thereby permitting them to virtually predetermine the results of
elections.
A. The Dangers of Partisan Gerrymandering
By allowing a majority party to control the process of drawing
election district boundaries, "the redistricting process skews the
overall distribution of districts, producing nothing but relatively
safe districts, with the map-drawing party capturing most of those
districts while conceding a smaller number to the out-party."8 As a
result, the "allocation of political power is essentially frozen into
place for a decade, regardless of shifts in voters' preferences." 9 Ro-
bust political competition is a fundamental tenet of the United
States constitutional structure. 0 Partisan gerrymandering chips
away at this constitutional foundation by eliminating nearly all
competition for legislative seats in certain districts, thereby dimin-
ishing the accountability of elected officials."
The recent congressional elections are poignant examples of the
way in which competition in American politics has been dimin-
ished. In the 2000 congressional elections, nearly ninety-nine
percent of incumbent representatives resecured their seats in the
U.S. House of Representatives, and close to eighty-three percent did
so with more than twenty percent of the vote. 2 In the 2004 congres-
sional elections, more than eighty-five percent of incumbents in the
7. Under Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, congressional districts are to be ap-
portioned every ten years according to census data. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("Representatives
and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included
within this Union, according to their respective Numbers.... The actual Enumeration shall
be made ... within every subsequent Term of ten Years."). This reapportionment is neces-
sary in order to satisfy the one-person, one-vote requirement articulated by the Supreme
Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). It is worth noting that in 2006, the Supreme
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not per se prohibit mid-decade redistrict-
ing plans. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). Thus,
redistricting can occur more often than every ten years. See id.
8. Pamela S. Karlan, The Partisan of Nonpartisanship: Justice Stevens and the Law of De-
mocracy, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2187, 2196 (2006).
9. Id.
10. DarylJ. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
REv. 2311, 2313 (2006).
11. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. RF. 593, 600-
01 (2002).
12. Id. at 623-25.
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U.S. House of Representatives won by more than sixty percent. 13 By
virtually ensuring that politicians will resecure their seats, partisan
gerrymandering makes voting a nearly futile exercise: "It used to
be that the idea was, once every two years voters elected their rep-
resentatives, and now, instead, it's every ten years the
representatives choose their constituents .... Congressmen are
more likely to die or be indicted than they are to lose a seat. 1 4 Our
government was founded on the theory that the powers of gov-
ernment are derived from the "consent of the governed,' ' but
without truly representative elections our representatives do not
need to garner the voters' "consent" in order to retain their power.
In order for us to be a "government of the people by the people
for the people, '6 the voters must be permitted to participate in fair
elections and hold their representatives accountable.
B. The Lack ofJudicial Solutions to Partisan Gerrymandering
Recognizing the dangers posed by partisan gerrymandering,
voters continually initiate litigation alleging that partisan gerry-
mandering violates their constitutional rights. Although the
Supreme Court has heard several of these cases, as explained be-
low, over the past twenty years, the Court has stalled in articulating
a judicial solution to the issue of partisan gerrymandering.
The Supreme Court first addressed partisan gerrymandering in
1986 in Davis v. Bandemer.1 7 In Bandemer, the plaintiffs claimed that
Indiana's legislative seats were reapportioned along partisan lines
in 1981 to disadvantage Democrats. 8 The Court held that the po-
litical question doctrine did not bar a political gerrymandering
claim. ' 9 The Court further held that such claims were justiciable
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
if the plaintiffs could prove both intentional discrimination against
a political group and the resulting discriminatory effect.2 0 Although
the plaintiffs were able to establish intent, they were unable to
13. CommonCause.org, Redistricting, http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=
dkLNKI MQIwG&b=196481 (last visited Jan. 18, 2007).
14. Jeffrey Toobin, Drawing the Line: Will 7bm DeLay's Redistricting in Texas Cost Him His
Seat?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 6, 2006, at 32, 35 (quoting Pamela Karlan, professor at Stanford
Law School).
15. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
16. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address para. 3 (1863), available at http://
www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=36&page=transcript.
17. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
18. Id. at 115.
19. Id. at 122-24.
20. Id. at 126-27.
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meet the threshold conditions for actual discriminatory effect.21
The Court had found the claims justiciable, but refused to be
drawn into the gerrymandering controversy by overturning the
1981 Indiana redistricting plan.
The Court reexamined partisan gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jube-
lire22 in 2004.2' The plaintiffs in that case alleged that the
reapportionment of Pennsylvania's districts by the General Assem-
bly was a partisan gerrymander and thus violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 4 The Court re-
viewed the lower court decisions over the years since Bandemer and
observed that the courts had been unable to articulate any sustain-
able standard by which to judge whether such gerrymandering had
occurred.25 As a result, the plurality of the Court held that such
claims were nonjusticiable given that "no judicially discernible and
manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering
claims [had] emerged. 2 6 Although the majority refused to over-
turn the holding of Bandemer, the Court still refused to intervene in
the redistricting controversy. In Vieth, the Supreme Court contin-
ued to excise itself from constitutional review of partisan
gerrymandering.
Most recently, in 2006, the Court considered claims resulting
from redistricting in Texas.27 In League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Perry,28 the plaintiffs contended that the mid-decade
Texas redistricting by Tom Delay was an unconstitutional political
gerrymander. The Court did not reexamine its justiciability
21. Id. at 127, 134.
22. Vieth v.Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
23. Id. at 281 ("Eighteen years ofjudicial effort with virtually nothing to show for itjus-
tify us in revisiting the question whether the standard promised by Bandemer exists.").
24. Id. at 272.
25. Id. at 279.
26. Id. at 281.
27. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). In 2003,
Tom Delay and the Texas legislature redistricted mid-decade, allowing the Republicans to
maintain their majority and even gain six additional congressional seats. Ryan P. Bates, Con-
gressional Authority to Require State Adoption of Independent Redistricting Commission, 55 DuKE L.J.
333, 333 (2005) ("The saga of the Texas re-redistricting, though perhaps an outlier in its
vituperative partisanship, its extraordinary drama, and its national media attention, was
certainly not the only gerrymander of the 2000 redistricting cycle. But as a parable illustrat-
ing the many harms engendered by partisan gerrymandering, it is without peer. The
political harms inflicted by the re-redistricting are plain: ruination of the bipartisan tradition
in the Texas legislature; inaccurate representation of voters' aggregate preferences at both
the statewide and national levels; months-long hijacking of the state legislative agenda, pre-
venting consideration of programs crucial to many Texans; millions of dollars spent on three
special legislative sessions; and violence to traditional notions of proper redistricting, such as
district compactness and the decennial cycle itself.").
28. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
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holding in Bandemer, but rather confined its review to the viability
of the standard presented by the plaintiffs. 29 The Court rejected
both the plaintiffs' theory that a mid-decade redistricting plan is
per se proof of the intent to politically gerrymander,"° as well as their
theory that a mid-decade redistricting for political reasons violated
the one-person, one-vote requirement.3 By rejecting the plaintiffs'
proposed partisan gerrymandering standard, the Supreme Court
continued to maintain considerable distance from upholding any
such redistricting claim.
Many argue that the rigid application of federal constitutional
principles to partisan gerrymandering claims would be the most
effective reform mechanism. 2 But because the Supreme Court has
thus far refused to resolve the partisan gerrymandering controversy
using constitutional principles, it is unlikely to do so in the future.3
If the Supreme Court will not provide a solution to the dangers of
partisan gerrymandering, then the solution must come from an
alternative source.
II. REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS AS A POTENTIAL CHECK
ON PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
Without judicial resolution of the partisan gerrymandering con-
troversy, state legislatures have attempted to solve the problem
themselves by creating redistricting commissions. This approach is
not novel; "[a]lmost all democracies in the world that use single-
member districts to elect legislators assign responsibility for draw-
ing districts to independent commissions, including Australia,
Canada, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom." 4 Re-
29. Id. at 2607.
30. Id. at 2610 ("The text and structure of the Constitution and our case law indicate
there is nothing inherently suspect about a legislature's decision to replace mid-decade a
court-ordered plan with one of its own. And even if there were, the fact of mid-decade redis-
tricting alone is no sure indication of unlawful political gerrymanders.").
31. Id. at 2611.
32. See Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the
Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 205 (2003) ("Perhaps the most
obvious reform would be for courts to apply the federal constitutional limits on partisan
gerrymandering much more aggressively. But there is little reason to think that will happen
anytime soon. Although the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Davis v. Bandemer made parti-
san-gerrymandering claims under the Equal Protection Clause justiciable, these claims have
almost never (in Professor Gary King's phrase) been justished.' No districting plan for
Congress or for either house of a state legislature has ever been invalidated under Bande-
mer." (internal citation omitted)).
33. Id.




districting commissions are composed of political or nonpolitical
actors who assume the responsibility for drawing district lines, a
task that is normally assigned to state legislatures.5 Advocacy
groups across the country have begun to promote the creation of
redistricting commissions to combat partisan gerrymandering.
Activists, legislators, and voters have launched a movement to
enact redistricting reform legislation across the country.37 Eleven
states have already formed redistricting commissions that are
wholly or partially comprised of non-elected officials .3 This move-
ment is aimed at reforming the redistricting process in the
remaining thirty-nine states.
California and Ohio are examples of states that have attempted
to implement redistricting commissions. In California, in conjunc-
tion with his "Year of Reform," Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
called for Californians to vote on four propositions in a special
election on June 13, 2005 . One of these propositions, Proposition
77, was to set up an independent redistricting commission con-
trolled by members of the state's Judicial Council.4 ° Although this
initiative was rejected by voters in November of 2005, Governor
35. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory Commis-
sions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1366, 1370-71 (2005) ("The celebrated
'intermediate institutions' formally remove certain questions from the legislature's domain.
Like the paradigmatic constitutional court, the paradigmatic districting commission ... is
expected to operate as an external regulator of electoral processes.");Jeffrey C. Kubin, The
Casefor Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REv. 837, 838 (1997).
36. See THE COUNCIL FOR EXCELLENCE IN GOVT & THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., THE
SHAPE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: REPORT OF THE REDISTRICTING REFORM CONFER-
ENCE 9 (2005), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/1460.pdf
(identifying the assignment of redistricting power to an independent commission as an
indispensable principle of reapportionment); see also CommonCause.org, supra note 13
(arguing that redistricting commissions are necessary to establish competitive elections).
37. See Nicholas D. Mosich, Judging the Three-Judge Panel: An Evaluation of California's
Proposed Redistricting Commission, 79 S. CAL. L. Rv. 165, 165-67 (2005) ("Spurred by progres-
sively less competitive elections for the U.S. House of Representatives and state legislatures,
and by the increasing success of partisan and bipartisan gerrymanders in manipulating the
outcomes of those elections, calls for change have recently attracted national attention.
Following the 2004 elections-the results of which revealed some of the least competitive
races for state legislative and congressional seats in American history and exposed two of the
most effective and egregious political gerrymanders ever accomplished-those calls rose to a
fever pitch." (internal citations omitted)).
38. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Missouri,
Montana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington. See The Campaign Legal Ctr.,
Redistricting: Redistricting Commissions: Current State Commissions, http://
www.campaignlegalcenter.org/redistricting-226.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). Ohio and
Arkansas have redistricting commissions wholly comprised of elected officials. Id.
39. Scott M. Lesowitz, Recent Development: Independent Redistricting Commissions, 43 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 535, 536 (2006).
40. See Peter Nicholas, Schwarzenegger to Offer Lawmakers a Deal L.A. TIMES, July 14,
2006, at Bus. Sec.
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Schwarzenegger has already begun creating a new redistricting re-
form plan that may make California elections more competitive."
Similarly, in 2005, Ohio proposed an amendment to the Ohio
Constitution that would have "provide [d] for the creation of a state
redistricting commission with responsibility for creating legislative
districts."02 On November 8, 2005, sixty-nine percent of the voters
defeated the proposition.3 Although it did not pass, the Ohio ini-
tiative garnered significant attention, and Ohio's backlash
movement against gerrymandering continues to search for a re-
form initiative." In addition to the California and Ohio initiatives,
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin have
45similar resolutions pending before their respective legislatures.
In addition to states' efforts, the federal government has taken
its own steps to mandate that states governments use redistricting
commissions. On May 25, 2005, Representative John S. Tanner, a
Democrat from Tennessee, introduced the Fairness and Independ-
ence in Redistricting Act of 2005, which would require states to use
a bipartisan redistricting commission to complete congressional
46redistricting. Congressman Tanner identified defeating partisan
gerrymandering as the chief objective of the legislation.4 7 Six
months later, on October 20, 2005, Representative Zoe Lofgren, a
Democrat from California, introduced the Redistricting Reform
41. Id.
42. State Issue 4-Amended Certified Ballot Language: Nov. 8, 2005 (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/
ElectionsVoter/results2005.aspx?Section=1042 (last visitedJan. 9, 2007).
43. State Issue 4--Official Results: Nov. 8, 2005 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform), http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/ElectionsVoter/results2005.aspx?
Section=1 168 (last visitedJan. 9, 2007).
44. The Ohio State Legislature is currently considering H.J.R. 13, which establishes
new procedures for drawing election district boundaries. Ohio Legislative Serv. Comm'n, H.J.R.
13 Resolution Analysis, 123d G.A. (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform), http://www.Isc.state.oh.us/analyses/hjrl3-i.pdf.
45. The Council for Excellence in Gov't & The Campaign Legal Ctr., Redistricting:
Redistricting Commissions: Pending State-by-State Proposals (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform), http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/redistricting-
225.html (last visitedJan. 18, 2007).
46. Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2005, H.R. 2642, 109th Cong.
(2005).
47. John Tanner, Legislation: Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act (HR
2642), http://www.house.gov/tanner/legislation-redistricting.htm (last visited Jan. 18,
2007) ("[Blecause of political gerrymandering, only 5 percent of Congressional incumbents
lost their seats in [the 2004] election, fewer turnovers than in the Soviet Politburo."); Dan
Gilgoff, A Fake Democracy , U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, May 15, 2006, at 35, 37 (quoting
Tanner as stating "[our] system has produced gridlock in Washington because of lack of
competition in the districts. Compromise is now considered a sign of weakness ... ").
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Act of 2005.48 Both bills have been referred to the House Judiciary
Committees where they await consideration.
Because the Supreme Court has refused to address the constitu-
tionality of partisan redistricting, both state and federal legislatures
have created or attempted to create redistricting commissions as
an alternative solution. Three fundamental elements compose a
redistricting commission: the commission's membership, the fac-
tors the commission considers in the districting process, and the
ratification process. As this wave of potential reform persists, no
one commission structure has emerged as superior to all others.0
While no one particular combination of elements can guarantee
nonpartisan elections, this Note argues that ratification through
automatic state supreme is a necessary component of every redis-
tricting commission.
A. The Models of Membership Structure for Redistricting Commissions
Membership in the redistricting commission is the threshold
consideration in the formation process.5' The commission can be
bipartisan (composed of officials from each political party), parti-
san (composed of political actors holding certain positions within
government), or independent (composed of nonpartisan offi-
cials) .
Commissions composed of sitting government officials guaran-
tee no partisan balance and allow partisan influences to greatly
influence the redistricting process. 3 Independent commissions are
ideally composed of officials with no official party tie and selected
in a politically neutral manner. However, "independent election
officials will be only as good as the process of selecting them." 4 By
48. Redistricting Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 4094, 109th Cong. (2005).
49. LIBRARY OF CONG., ALL CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS FOR H.R. 2642, http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR02642:@@@X; LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ALL
CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS FOR H.R. 4094, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
z?d109:HR04094:@@@X.
50. See Kubin, supra note 35, at 841-55 (describing the many different commission
structures and the advantages and disadvantages of each).
51. For more information about membership structure, see generally Kubin, supra note
35; Mosich, supra note 37.
52. See Kubin, supra note 35, at 845-848.
53. Id. at 849.
54. OVERTON, supra note 34, at 36-38 ("Even a commission with strong procedural
safeguards may not be completely free of prejudices-just as juries and judges are never
completely immune. The test of independent redistricting, however, is not whether it com-
pletely eliminates bias but rather whether it reduces the personal and professional stake that
decisionmakers have in the political outcome.").
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contrast, bipartisan commissions can have an equal number of
members from each political party, but this option presents the
potential for deadlock and can also result in a bipartisan gerry-
mander, establishing protection for both parties' incumbents.5
Bipartisan commissions can also take the form of tie-breaking
commissions, which "pit equal numbers of party-political commis-
sioners against one another with a tie-breaking chairman to
monitor and referee the ensuing struggle." 6 Defenders of a bipar-
tisan structure argue that these commissions "encourage[]
"07moderation and compromise within the redistricting process.
However, these commissions also present the disadvantage of
maintaining partisan control; the tie-breaking vote in such a com-
mission potentially enables one party to control the districting
process if consensus is abandoned.5 If the membership structure
does not eliminate partisan actors from the redistricting process it
will continue to resemble the process as controlled by sitting legis-
lators by allowing partisan influences to affect the results of the
commission's work.
B. The Factors to Be Considered by the Redistricting Commission
The second element in the process of establishing a redistricting
commission is determining the factors that the commission will
consider when redistricting. Each existing statute that creates a re-
districting commission mandates the use of distinct criteria. For
example, the Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act
mandates that the commission adhere to all constitutional and
statutory requirements, maintain geographic continuity of political
55. Bates, supra note 27, at 349; see also Gordon S. Harrison, The Aftermath of In re 2001
Redistricting Cases: The Need for a New Constitutional Scheme for Legislative Redistricting in Alaska,
23 ALAsKA L. REv. 51, 75 (2006) ("[A]ny bipartisan plan will be a collusive agreement to
protect the status quo-even those produced by a bipartisan commission that operates as
designed to operate (that is, with a neutral, tie-breaking member who effectively forces the
partisan members to compromise and cooperate in designing a plan)."); Kubin, supra note
35, at 860 ("The public policy danger of a tie-breaking commission's institutionalized system
of checks and balances is that by encouraging moderation and compromise it will, in fact,
promote a bipartisan gerrymander.").
56. Kubin, supra note 35, at 856.
57. Id. at 839 ("Recognizing that it is all but impossible to take politics and self-interest
out of the redistricting process, a tie-breaking commission takes a Madisonian approach to
reform by using the mechanics of the process to channel the motives of its participants. A
tie-breaking commission is not an idealistic vision of redistricting reform. Rather, it is a real-
istic means of restoring an element of fairness and balance to a task that is and always will be
a matter of survival for politicians and a struggle for legislative power for political parties."
(internal citation omitted)).
58. Id. at 849.
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subdivisions (including parishes, municipalities, and neighbor-
hoods), and maintain compact and contiguous districts.59 By
contrast, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission is
required to favor competitive districts to the extent practicable
without detriment to the commission's other goals, such as ensur-
ing equality of population, the compactness and contiguity of the
districts, respect of communities of interest, and compliance with
federal election law.60 Many commissions are also required not to
consider certain factors. For example, the Iowa Code provides that
to the extent unnecessary for compliance with federal law, the ad-
dresses of incumbents, the political affiliation of registered voters,
previous election results, and other demographic data, should not
be considered in drawing district boundaries.6 ' A statutorily created
redistricting commission is beholden to the statute that created it.
If the statute does not dictate which factors a commission may or
may not utilize, there is little guidance on how the commission will
redistrict and no guarantee that the process will produce fairer and
less partisan results. Furthermore, if the statute allows the commis-
sion to use partisan factors in redistricting, such as the political
affiliation of registered voters, then there is a significant chance
that such information will be used. As a result, it is imperative that
legislators decide what factors the commission should and should
not take into consideration in its districting when creating redis-
tricting commissions because these factors can have a significant
influence on the ability of a commission to reapportion in a fair
and just manner.
C. The Process by Which a Redistricting Plan Is Ratified
The remaining element to be determined in the formation of a
redistricting commission is the process by which the commissions'
reapportionment plans are ratified. Redistricting commissions util-
ize different mechanisms to approve and implement a districting
plan. Under Article IV of the Arizona Constitution, the plan as
adopted by the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission is
59. Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2005, H.R. 2642, 109th Cong.
§ 4(b)(1) (2005). Similar to the Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act, Article VI
of the Alaskan Constitution requires that the Alaskan Redistricting Board form contiguous
and compact boundaries that consider local government boundaries. ALASKA CONST. art. VI,
§ 6.
60. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1.
61. IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.4(5) (West 1999); see also H.R. 2642 § 4(b) (2).
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final after a thirty-day public comment period; no other steps are
necessary to approve or enforce the plan.62 Similarly, in Alaska, the
Redistricting Board's final approved plan is presumed binding;
however, a suit initiated by a "qualified voter" within thirty days of
the adoption of the final plan can halt its implementation.2 In
Iowa, the redistricting plan must be approved by the Iowa General
Assembly, and because the districting plan is embodied in a bill,
the governor has veto power.64 In yet another ratification process,
the Colorado Constitution requires mandatory judicial review by
the Colorado Supreme Court. However, in Colorado, neither the
governor nor the legislature has any power to arrest the enforce-
ment of the plan. Though ratification procedures can vary widely
throughout the states, this Note argues that a properly formulated
ratification process can greatly influence the effectiveness of a re-
districting commission, and, if an ineffective process is used,
partisan influences can continue to plague the course of redistrict-
ing.
III. PROCEDURAL OPTIONS FOR RATIFICATION OF REDISTRICTING
COMMISSION'S REDISTRICTING PLANS
While it is possible for a redistricting plan to be adopted without
any ratification process, there are several mechanisms by which a
redistricting plan can be ratified: ratification by executive or legis-
lative veto and by automatic state supreme court review. Using
Arizona's redistricting procedure as an example, this Note argues
that the lack of any ratification process for a districting plan can
delay elections and cause significant monetary costs to accrue to
the state.66 This Note also uses the example of Iowa's procedure to
show how legislative or executive veto of a redistricting plan per-
mits partisan influences to penetrate the redistricting ratification
67process. Lastly, this Note argues that mandatory and automatic
judicial review by the state's supreme court, for example as man-
dated by the Colorado State Constitution, is the most politically
neutral ratification procedure because it provides a fair and effi-
cient oversight system that respects the institutional competence of
62. Unless of course, litigation challenging the plan is brought and a court invalidates
the plan.
63. See ALAs KA CONST. art. VI, § 11.
64. See IowA CODE ANN. § 42.3.
65. See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48 (e).
66. See infra Part III.A.
67. See infra Part III.B.
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the judiciary to review redistricting for compliance with the law.
Although automatic judicial review does not of itself ensure com-
petitive elections, this ratification procedure most advantageously
furthers a redistricting commissions' purpose of furthering robust
political competition for legislative seats.
A. The Effect of an Absence of a Ratification Procedure
on Redistricting Commission's Plans
Arizona does not have a formal ratification process because the
commission's boundaries are self-executing unless the commission
makes changes. 8 Under the Arizona State Constitution, the Ari-
zona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC) must
advertise the draft redistricting map to the public for comment for
at least thirty days.69 Additionally, either or both houses of the Ari-
zona legislature may make recommendations regarding the
redistricting plan during this time.70 After this thirty-day period, the
commission establishes the final boundaries.7 With no formal rati-
fication process, the Arizona redistricting process is ineffectual in
ensuring fair, constitutional, and timely elections.
The 2001 redistricting cycle in Arizona was protracted and left
the state without a final plan for several years. According to the
procedures outlined in the Arizona Constitution, the AIRC
adopted a redistricting plan in October of 2001 and, after thirty
days of comment, the AIRC certified the plan to the Secretary of
State in November of 2001. 72 On March 6, 2002, the Arizona Mi-
nority Coalition for Fair Redistricting (the "Coalition") and other
plaintiffs challenged the redistricting plan for failure to create and
preserve competitive districts as mandated by the Arizona Constitu-
tion.73 Two additional actions were filed in federal court on May 1,
2002 alleging that the plan would diminish the voting strength of
Native Americans in contravention of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. 4 The AIRC was also required to seek preclearance of
68. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(15-16).
69. Id. at § 1 (16).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 230 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1002 (D.
Ariz. 2002).
73. Id. at 1002.
74. Id. at 1003.
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the redistricting plan from the Department of Justice.7' The delays
caused by litigation and the need for Justice Department approval
created an election emergency in Arizona; candidates were unsure
from what district they needed their petitions, signatures, and
funds.6 As a result, the parties to the litigation stipulated to a tem-
porary plan for use in the 2002 elections.77 Without any ratification
process, the redistricting procedures in Arizona left the plan open
to attack from several angles and consequently, left the elections in
flux for several years.
Without a ratification process, the election emergency contin-
ued as further litigation ensued. In August of 2002, the AIRC
adopted a new plan to be used for elections from 2004 through
2010.79 The Coalition filed a new complaint challenging the
amended plan and the federal district court remanded the case to
state court in September of 2003 because the plaintiffs were only
seeking relief under state law.A In November of 2003, a trial on the
validity of the amended plan commenced."' The Court held that
the redistricting plan violated the state constitution, and the AIRC
was forced to draft a new plan and commit that plan to a period of
thirty day comment. 2 A final plan was not adopted until April 12,
2004.83 As the courts grappled with the validity of the redistricting
plan, candidates for the Arizona legislature in the 2004 election
were left uncertain about what map they were to use in determin-
ing which district they would be a candidate to represent.84 Eventhough the AIRC had devised a redistricting plan, the AIRC and
75. Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, Arizona, due to a history of discrimina-
tion, is required to submit any districting plans for review by the Department of Justice. U.S.
Dep't ofJustice Civil Rights Div., Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
voting/sec_5/covered.htm (last visitedJan. 18, 2007).
76. Navajo Nation, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 1005.
77. Id. at 1000-01.
78. Elvia Diaz, Legislative Area Maps Rejected: Court Won't Allow New Districts, ARIz. RE-
PUBLIC, May 29, 2004, http://ww.searclub.com?page=news-article&id=559.
79. Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n,
284 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1242 (D. Ariz. 2003).
80. Id. at 1249.
81. Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n,
366 F. Supp. 2d 887, 891 (D. Ariz. 2005).
82. Id.
83. Id. Further litigation ensued because of the lack of pre-clearance by the Depart-
ment ofJustice, but that litigation will not be discussed in this Note.
84. See Kristina Betts, Redistricting: Who Should Draw the Lines? The Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission as a Model for Change, 48 ARiz. L. REv. 171, 172-73 (2006) ("[fln the
spring of 2004, potential candidates for the Arizona House of Representatives and Arizona
Senate anxiously waited to hear which district they would be running in for the September
primary and November general elections. The candidates' uncertainty stemmed from a 2004
Arizona Superior Court decision holding the district lines used in the 2002 Arizona elec-
tions unconstitutional." (internal citation omitted)).
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the Arizona Secretary of State used the former boundaries for the
2004 election because there was insufficient time to prepare the
ballots and other necessary materials.5 ' The Arizona Secretary of
State stated that the consistent litigation and uncertainty had "put
a huge hiccup on [the] election process.""'
Although the AIRC had drawn and adopted several redistricting
plans since 2001, the Arizona elections were delayed and con-
ducted pursuant to a temporary map.$' This temporary map was
outdated, and, because it was not drawn according to the proce-
dure delineated by the Arizona Constitution,8 could not have
considered the goals set forth by the Arizona Constitution. Fur-
thermore, Proposition 106, which amended the Arizona
Constitution to include the AIRC, was designed to avoid the dead-
lock that had occurred in the Arizona legislature over the 1990
decennial redistricting. 9 However, the persistent litigation follow-
ing the 2000 redistricting cycle repeatedly stalled the
implementation of a final plan and the deadlock that Proposition
106 aspired to prevent ensued. As a result, the legislative purpose
in creating the AIRC had been frustrated.
The AIRC revealed its first redistricting plan in November of
2001 and the first challenge was filed in March of 2002.' ° Each time
a challenge to the plan was filed, it took several months for the
court to render its decision striking down the plan. 91 Then the
AIRC would have to draw up a new map that would once again be
challenged9 As a result of this process, the AIRC did not draw
constitutional boundaries until April of 2004.9  Because this map
was drawn too late in the election year, the map could only be used
in the following election cycle.94
The persistent litigation revealed that the AIRC's redistricting
plans had constitutional flaws. With only the AIRC itself as over-
sight to its redistricting, the AIRC had to await several court
decisions in order to discover what constitutional errors the map
85. Dfaz, supra note 78.
86. Id.
87. Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 230 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1000-01
(D. Ariz. 2002).
88. ARIz. CONST. art. V, Pt. 2, § 1.
89. Betts, supra note 84, at 191.
90. Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n,
366 F Snpp. 2d 887, 890 (D. Ariz. 2005).
91. Id. at 890-91.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 891.
94. Diaz, supra note 78.
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contained. With a proper ratification process, these flaws could
have been discovered prior to the initiation of litigation and cor-
rected. Instead, it took the AIRC three years to correct its errors,
leaving Arizona without constitutionally sound election districts for
four years.
B. Ratification by Executive and Legislative Veto
In contrast to Arizona's lack of a ratification procedure for plans
devised by its redistricting commission, the Iowa redistricting proc-
ess sets forth a mechanism of ratification through legislative and
gubernatorial approval. Although Iowa's elections have been com-
petitive, its process does permit partisan influences to permeate
the redistricting process. Iowa's path towards the creation of a re-
districting commission began in 1968, when the Iowa General
Assembly, then in control of redistricting, adopted redistricting
plans for the State Senate and the House.95 This plan was chal-
lenged in state court, and in 1972 the Supreme Court of Iowa
declared the plan to be an unconstitutional reapportionment be-
cause it did not attempt to achieve voter equality.96 As a result, the
General Assembly enacted House File 707, codified in Iowa Code
Chapter 42, which transferred control over the redistricting proc-
ess to a nonpartisan agency, the Legislative Services Bureau
("LSB") .9
Although Iowa, in contrast to Arizona, has codified a ratification
mechanism in its redistricting process, its process is ineffectual in
removing partisan influences. The Iowa Code sets forth a timetable
for redistricting that the LSB and General Assembly must follow.
The Code mandates that by April 1 of any redistricting year, the
LSB must bring the bill reflecting the redistricting to a vote in ei-
ther the House or Senate "expeditiously" and "not less than seven
days after the report.., is received."9 8 If the plan does not garner
majority approval of both, the LSB must submit a second amended
plan by May 1 or twenty-one days after the vote that failed the bill.99
The legislature is only permitted to make corrective amendments
95. IowA GEN. ASSEMBLY-LEGISLATIVE SERVS. BUREAU, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE TO RE-
DISTRICTING II (Dec. 2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
http://www.legis.state.ia.us/Central/LSB/Guides/redist.htm.
96. In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1972), supple-
mented by 196 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa 1972), amended by 199 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972).
97. IOWA GEN. ASSEMBLY-LEGISLATIVE SERVS. BUREAU, supra note 95, at II.C.
98. IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.3(1) (West 1999).
99. IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.3(2).
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to the first and second proposed redistricting plans. l° If the second
plan does not pass with a majority vote in either house, the LSB
must submit a third plan, which is subject to any amendments by
the legislature.0 Additionally, because the districting plans take
the form of bills resembling the standard legislative practice, the
governor has veto power over the plans. °2 Although the Iowa struc-
ture has yielded quite competitive districts,"10 the ratification
process following Iowa redistricting does not sufficiently eliminate
partisan influences.
The latest redistricting cycle in Iowa demonstrates the potential
for political powers to manipulate the districting process. At the
time of the 2001 redistricting, the Republicans controlled the ma-
jority in the Iowa General Assembly, but the governor (the
executive branch) was Tom Vilsack, a Democrat. 10 4 The first plan
submitted by the LSB was rejected by the Iowa Senate in a
twenty-seven to twenty-one vote in April 2001."'" The vote split vir-
tually down partisan lines, with all Republicans voting against the
bill except for one.10 6 The new map was disfavored by Republicans
because the introduction of a large Western rural district would
100. IOWA GENERAL ASSEMBLY -LEGISLATIVE SERVICES BUREAU, supra note 95, at
V.B.3.a.
101. Id.
102. IOWA CONST. art. III, § 16 ("Every bill which shall have passed the General Assem-
bly, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor. If he approve, he shall sign
it; but if not, he shall return it with his objections, to the House in which it originated, which
shall enter the same upon their journal, and proceed to reconsider it; if, after such recon-
sideration, it again pass both Houses, by yeas and nays, by a majority of two-thirds of the
members of each House, it shall become a law, notwithstanding the Governor's objec-
tions.").
103. Thomas Beaumont, Political Hot Spot? It's Iowa, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 1, 2002, at
Al ("Few states outside Iowa have more than one or two closely contested congressional
races-those in which polls show the major-party candidates within 10 percentage points of
each other and one party's registration total isn't significantly larger than the other's. 'With
realistically only 20 competitive House races in the country-20 out of more than 400-if
you get a bunch of them in an area like this, it makes Iowa an interesting place,' said Dan
Thomas, political science professor at Wartburg College in Waverly."); see also Brian O'Neill,
The Case for Federal Anti-Gerrymandering Legislation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 711-12
(2005) ("Iowa accounted for ten percent of the nation's competitive congressional elections
in 2002, though it elects barely one percent of Congress.").
104. See generally FAIR VOTE, VOTING & DEMOCRACY RESEARCH CTR., 2000 REDISTRICT-
ING REPORT, IOWA (2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
http://www.fairvote.org/?page=305.
105. Jennifer Dukes Lee, Leaders Signal Bipartisan OK for Remap, DES MOINES REG., June
5, 2001, at 1 B; Senate Rejects Districts; Iowa Legislative Maps: Democrats Accuse Republicans of Seek-
ing Districts Favorable to the GOP, TELEGRAPH HERALD, May 3, 2001, at Al.
106. Editorial, Not Compact, Not Convenient; the Proposed Congressional Districts Are a Disaster
for lowans, DES MOINES REG.,June 10, 2001, at 16A.
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have diminished their control over the legislature. 107 In particular,
the first plan would have pitted two Republican incumbents, Con-
gressmen Leach and Nussle, against each other in a new district.'8
Iowa House Speaker Brent Siegrist commented that the first plan
was unfavorable because "[t]he big disappointment is having two
congressmen tossed in together."' 9 The Republican Party's inten-
tion was not to lose a legislative seat during the redistricting
process.
Even though the second plan submitted by the LSB was ap-
proved by the legislature and signed into law by Governor Vilsack
on June 22, 2001," the April 2001 ratification process demon-
strates the continued presence of partisan forces. Although the
approved plan still forced certain Republican incumbents to run in
new districts, some analysts contend that because of Democratic
Governor Vilsack, the Republican-controlled legislature was forced
to accept one of the LSB plans."' If the second plan had been re-
jected, the legislature would have been allowed to make
amendments, which likely would have led to a prolonged debate in
the General Assembly. If agreement was not reached by September,
then the Iowa Supreme Court would redistrict;" 2 however, the Iowa
legislature was likely hesitant to cede districting power to the judi-
ciary, because judicial redistricting would not guarantee which
party judicially-drawn redistricting would favor. Even if the Repub-
lican-controlled Iowa legislature was able to dominate the
redistricting process during the debate over a third plan, the threat
of a veto by Governor Vilsack likely motivated the Republicans to
compromise on the second plan." 3 Specifically, Senator Steve King,
a Republican, stated that the second plan was "as good as we're
likely to see."" 4 Notwithstanding this compromise, the Republicans
107. Chris Clayton, Districts Sketched Again a Second Attempt to Redraw Iowa's Political Land-
scape Holds Both Good and Bad Omens for Lawmakers in the West Proposed Iowa Congressional
Districts by the Numbers, OMAHA WORLD HERALD,June 2, 2001, at 1.
108. Joann Dann, Safe But Sorry; The Way We Redistrict Destroys the Middle Ground, WASH.
POST, Dec. 2, 2001, at B1. Representatives Jim Leach and Jim Nussle were reelected in 2002
to separate districts. U.S. House of Representatives, CHI. TRiB., Nov 7, 2002, at N18.
109. Chris Clayton, New Political Map Keeps an Old Sticking Point Proposed Iowa Congres-
sionalDistricts, OMAHA WORLD HERALD,June 1, 2001, at 13.
110. Lynn Okamoto, Vilsack Scores a Slew of Vetoes, DES MOINES REG., June 20, 2001, at
lB.
111. See, e.g., FAIR VOTE, VOTING & DEMOCRACY RESEARCH CTR., supra note 104.
112. Senate Rejects Districts; Iowa Legislative Maps: Democrats Accuse Republicans of Seeking
Districts Favorable to the GOP, supra note 105, at Al.
113. FAIR VOTE, VOTING & DEMOCRACY RESEARCH CTR., supra note 104.
114. Lynn Okamoto & Jennifer Dukes Lee, Lawmakers OK New Map; The Revised Legisla-
ture and Congressional Districts are "As Good As We're Likely to See," One Republican Says, DES
MOINES REG.,June 20, 2001, at lB.
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continued to control the legislature both before and after the 2001
redistricting, the first time one party had maintained control
through a redistricting cycle before and since the transfer of dis-
tricting power to the LSB.
By allowing the General Assembly to approve and the Governor
to veto a redistricting plan, the Iowa redistricting process remains
vulnerable to partisan influences. If the Governor were Republi-
can, the resultant redistricting likely would have favored the
Republicans even more, even though they retained power after the
redistricting cycle. Furthermore, Iowa has consistently been a state
without traditional Republican or Democratic leanings.115 If the
same legislative mechanism were utilized in another state with par-
tisan leanings, the results would most likely be equally partisan.
With single-party control of both the Legislature and the Executive
branches, the ratification process under the Iowa scheme is re-
duced to a mere rubber stamp of a partisan reapportionment map.
C. Automatic State Supreme Court Review
It is clear that no ratification procedure or a partisan ratification
procedure can subvert the goals of redistricting commissions by
permitting partisan influences to permeate the redistricting proc-
ess, which should be nonpartisan to encourage strong political
competition. A third potential ratification procedure, automatic
state supreme court review, is the most desirable procedure be-
cause it is the most likely to yield nonpartisan state voting districts.
Colorado is an example of a state that utilizes the automatic
state supreme court ratification mechanism. Article V of the Colo-
rado Constitution requires that within "one hundred twenty-three
115. Iowa is traditionally regarded as a "swing" state in national elections. See Down on
the Farm; Swing States: Iowa, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 2004, at 29, 29 ("Iowa is considered one of
the most contested states in the nation. Mr. Bush lost to Al Gore in Iowa in 2000 by only
4,000 votes."). The composition of the Iowa legislature also demonstrates that Iowans tend
not to swing one way or another. For example, in 2006 the Iowa Senate was evenly split be-
tween the Democrats and Republicans and the Republicans only had a two-seat majority in
the House. Press Release, Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Top 10 Election Battle-
grounds: Much at Stake (Aug. 16, 2006) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2006/prO60816election.htm. Further-
more, the Des Moines Register reports that about thirty-eight percent of Iowans neither
identify themselves as Democrat nor Republican, and thirty-one percent identify themselves
as Democrats and thirty as Republicans. Thomas Beaumont, Analysis: Nussle's Declaration May
Elevate Issue's Prominence with Voters, DESMOINESREGISTER.COM, Sept. 10, 2006 (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), http://desmoinesregister.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060910/NEWS09/60909016/1001.
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days prior to the date established in statute for precinct caucuses
... or ... no later than one hundred twenty-three days prior to the
date established in statute for the event commencing the candidate
selection process in such year," the Colorado reapportionment
commission shall submit a finalized plan to the Colorado Supreme
Court for review for compliance with the state Constitution."6 The
Constitution mandates that review of the plan must be the first
priority over all other pending matters before the court and that
the court must review the redistricting plan before hearing new
cases or deciding pending cases." 7 If the Court rejects the plan, the
commission must revise and resubmit the plan to the court within
a period of time as specified by the court."8 This form of review was
applied by the Colorado Reapportionment Commission ("CRC")
and the Colorado Supreme Court in May of 2001. The CRC held
fourteen meetings between May 11, 2001 and August 30, 2001 to
draft a preliminary plan." 9 Thereafter, the CRC convened twenty-
two public hearings to receive comment on the preliminary plan.
The CRC then finalized its plan on November 27, 2001.12° On re-
view, the Supreme Court held that the plan did "not comply with
the substantive and procedural requirements of the Colorado Con-
stitution.' 2 ' The court held that the final plan of the CRC must
more adequately conform to the constitutional priority of the
maintenance of county boundaries, and the CRC must review and
revise the plan for consistency with these criteria. 2 2 The court or-
dered the CRC to submit an amended plan by February 15, 2002.123
On February 22, 2002, the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the
revised plan submitted by the CRC and held that the "Commission
116. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48. The Colorado Reapportionment Commission is only re-
sponsible for reapportioning state legislative boundaries. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d 1237, 1246 (Colo. 2002).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1254.
122. Id. at 1251-52 ("[TIhe constitutional criteria [] contemplate the Commission tak-
ing an overview of Colorado's population by county, then generating a map that respects the
state's legal preference for county integrity, then applying minimization of city divisions,
compactness, contiguity, and community of interest criteria ... when necessary. The Com-
mission relies on a community of interest rationale to support denying whole county seats to
counties that qualify for them, but this is the least weighty of the Section 46 and 47 criteria.
The Commission's reordering of the criteria offends the constitution. While the Commis-
sion has discretion to make necessary compromises, it cannot advance the lesser community
of interest criteria over the greater requirement not to make county divisions unless neces-
sary to meet equal population requirements." (internal citations omitted)); Karen Abbott,
Plan to Redraw State Legislative Districts Rejected; Court Returns Plan to Commission, Order Fewer
Counties Split, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws,Jan. 29, 2002, at 10A.
123. In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d at 1254-55.
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ha[d] followed the procedures and applied the criteria of federal
and Colorado law in adopting its 2002 Final Reapportionment Plan
for Colorado General Assembly house and senate districts."'' 24 The
redistricting and ratification process in the 2001 Colorado redis-
tricting demonstrate the advantages of automatic judicial review by
the state's supreme court; these advantages include ensuring that
timely elections are held pursuant to a constitutionally valid redis-
tricting plan, barring the judiciary from engaging in redistricting
and not subjecting the state to high financial costs.
In particular, automatic judicial review enhances the goals of a
redistricting commission by further restraining the effects of parti-
san gerrymandering. First, mandatory and automatic judicial
review recognizes the institutional competence of the legislature.
The U.S. Constitution states that "[t] he Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be pre-
scribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as
to the Places of chusing Senators.' ' 25 This Clause can be inter-
preted to mean that congressional redistricting is the sole province
of the state legislature.' 21 In Colegrove v. Green, 27 the Supreme Court
dismissed a challenge to a districting plan because the Court found
the issue was "of a peculiarly political nature." '12 Justice Frankfurter,
who wrote the majority opinion, stated that:
[c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy
for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that
will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of
Congress. The Constitution has many commands that are not
124. In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 46 P.3d 1083, 1087 (Colo. 2002);
Justices OK State Legislative Remap, DENVER POST, Feb. 24, 2002, at B5 ("The Colorado Su-
preme Court upheld on Friday the 10-year redrawing of new state House and Senate
districts, allowing lawmakers and prospective candidates to begin preparing for
the November election .... Friday's ruling came after the court rejected in late January a
drawing of the state's 35 Senate districts that it said violated the state constitution by splitting
several counties and denying four others a Senate seat.").
125. U.S. CONST. art I, § 4.
126. Hirsch, supra note 32, at 210-il ("[Elchoing Chief Justice Rehnquist's concur-
rence in Bush v. Gore, defendants will argue that the Elections Clause expressly delegates the
power of congressional redistricting to 'each State ... Legislature,' not to each State .... ");
Betts, supra note 84, at 177 ("Under the theory of separation of powers, redistricting falls
within the power of the legislature, which creates yet another political issue.").
127. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
128. Id. at 552.
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enforceable by courts because they clearly fall outside the
conditions and purposes that circumscribe judicial action."
The Supreme Court reinforced this sentiment forty years later in
Bandemer when it observed that lowering the threshold for sustain-
able legal action against political gerrymandering "would too much
embroil the judiciary in second-guessing what has consistently
been referred to as a political task for the legislature, a task that
should not be monitored too closely unless the express or tacit
goal is to effect its removal from legislative halls., 13 0 However, when
a redistricting commission is formed, the legislature cedes its dis-
tricting authority to the commission. If that mechanism fails, only
then should redistricting be reviewed by the court. Drawing district
lines must not be the province of the judiciary unless the legislative
mechanism fails and the judiciary is forced to redistrict.
Automatic judicial review recognizes this potential separation of
powers problem by giving state supreme courts a traditionally judi-
cial task: constitutional review. An integral part of a court's
responsibility is to ensure that acts of the executive and legislature
conform to the established law.13 1 With mandatory and automatic
judicial review, state supreme courts assume this role by ensuring
that the proposed redistricting plan is consistent with the applica-
ble constitutional and statutory regulations. The Colorado
Supreme Court affirmed this principle by explaining that its role in
the districting process was "a narrow one: to measure the present
reapportionment plan against the constitutional standards. The
choice among alternative plans, each consistent with constitutional
requirements, is for the Commission and not the Court."
1 32
Automatic supreme court review not only respects the tradi-
tional scope of the judiciary's competence, but it also eliminates
the opportunity for the judiciary to draw the district lines itself.
Automatic judicial review gives the inevitable challenge an auto-
129. Id. at 556.
130. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986); see also Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S.
535, 539-40 (1978) (holding that "redistricting and reapportioning legislative bodies is a
legislative task which the federal courts should make every effort not to pre-empt.").
131. As Justice Marshall famously proclaimed, "[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177
(1803).
132. In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 191, 194 (Colo. 1982); see
also In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d 1237, 1247 (Colo. 2002) ("Our
role in reviewing the Commission's reapportionment action is narrow. We must determine
whether the Commission followed the procedures and applied the criteria of federal and
Colorado law in adopting its reapportionment plan for Colorado General Assembly house




matic audience with final state authority. With this expedited time-
line, the redistricting commission has the opportunity to revise and
reformulate the district lines consistent with the judiciary's stan-
dards and current law. The Supreme Court of Colorado stated in
its latest review of the Commission's reapportionment plan that:
[the Court's] role does not include redrawing the statewide
apportionment map to comply with the applicable constitu-
tional criteria, this being the Commission's responsibility, and
because the Commission may choose to make other alterations
in district boundaries on remand in redrawing the apportion-
ment map, we set aside the Commission's action and remand
the Adopted Plan to the Commission for further consideration,
modification, re-adoption, and re-submittal.... 133
Automatic review and the chance for commission revisions dimin-
ish the chance of a failure in the districting process, which is when
courts generally engage in the exercise of districting.
Another reason why judicial review, not judicial redistricting, is
preferable is that as opposed to the federal bench, state judges are
often elected. In fact, some state judges are even nominated by po-
litical parties and may run on a partisan ballot.13 4 Thus, when an
elected judge draws voting district lines, it is difficult to say that the
process is "politics-blind". 3 5 When judges step out of the spectrum of
normal judicial activities and engage in redistricting, it increases the
opportunity for extra-legal influences to permeate the process.136
Although excising partisanship from elected judges may be diffi-
cult, the effect of political influences can be mitigated by confining
judges to their elected legal duties.
Given the partisanship of elected state judges, one could argue
that automatic review should be conducted by federal courts.
However, the United States Supreme Court has held that the state
court judiciary must receive priority when determining the
133. In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d at 1241.
134. Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and WNest Vir-
ginia use partisan elections at some point during the judicial selection process. Am.
JUDICATURE SOC'Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDIC-
TION COURTS 3 (2004), available at http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts.pdf.
135. Hirsch, supra note 32, at 213.
136. Id. at 211 ("[T]he court can either draw its own map or choose among those sub-
mitted by litigants. But in either event, the court will almost always have to choose among
multiple maps, several of which are perfectly legal. Therefore, the court must make recourse
to some 'extra-legal' criteria.").
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constitutionality of districting plans.3 7 In Growe v. Emison, the
Supreme Court held that "[i]n the reapportionment context, the
Court has required federal judges to defer consideration of
disputes involving redistricting where the State, through its
legislative or judicial branch, has begun to address that highly
political task itself."' l3s As a result, the partisanship of state court
judges will always be an obstacle to tackle and in fact, must be the
first to be confronted. This obstacle can be mitigated with
automatic state supreme court review, because the judiciary is
relegated to a quintessential judicial task.
A second advantage of automatic judicial review of commission
redistricting plans is securing the timeliness of elections. As dem-
onstrated by the Arizonan redistricting cycle in 2001,39 protracted
litigation can leave elections in flux and delay one of the funda-
mental components of American democracy. By foregoing the wait
for trial and intermediate court review, automatic judicial review by
the highest court of a state expedites the legal ratification of redis-
tricting plans. Naturally, delays in the election timeline are
inherent in the procedure of allowing for state supreme court re-
view. For example, in the Colorado redistricting cycle in 2001, the
court's rejection of the first plan caused some scheduling prob-
lems. The Colorado Secretary of State stated that the court's
decision would "change a lot of dates" and could potentially
change certain deadlines. 140 All that was required in such a situa-
tion was an emergency bill to be passed in the legislature to change
the election deadlines. 14 Nevertheless, the election proceeded on
schedule. 142 Automatic judicial review does not eliminate all delays,
but it helps elections to occur in a timely fashion and with a pre-
sumptively legal and constitutional redistricting plan.
Although automatic judicial review can help achieve finality and
efficiency in elections, in theory it may lead to a truncated review
of a redistricting plan because of the considerable time pressures.143
However, as exhibited by the Colorado Constitution, automatic ju-
dicial review does not require that there be a deadline for the
court to finish its review, so the court need not be rushed into a
137. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
138. Id. at 33 (emphasis in original).
139. See supra Part III.A.
140. Abbott, supra note 122.
141. Id.
142. See Ryan Morgan, At the Polls High Turnout Pleases Officials, But Some Problems Re-
ported, DENVER POST, Nov. 6, 2002, at E5.
143. Kubin, supra note 35, at 850-51.
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decision.1 44 For example, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected the
first plan submitted by the CRC, but while this rejection caused
time pressures, it did not cause the court to shirk from robust re-
view. Furthermore, the Colorado Constitution mandates that
review of the redistricting plan shall be the first priority on the
court's docket.145 With no unrealistic or pressing deadlines and a
constitutional mandate to put redistricting plan review above all
other matters, the court should be able to give a complete review
of the redistricting plan.
The efficient process of judicial review not only increases the
likelihood that elections will occur in a timely fashion, but also that
elections will proceed according to a constitutional redistricting
plan. The 2001 redistricting cycle in Arizona demonstrated that if
litigation delays the ratification of a commission-drawn redistrict-
ing plan, a temporary, outdated plan may be used in place of a
final plan drawn by the commission.4 6 If an outdated plan is util-
ized, it can potentially represent a violation of the constitutional
one-person, one-vote mandate. 4 7 Additionally, the use of a "tempo-
rary plan" (as in Arizona) or a judicially-created plan would signify
that the intended redistricting process had failed. It also may sig-
nify that the partisan influences that the commission was designed
to combat may seep back into the process. However, automatic re-
view is more likely to yield a constitutional redistricting plan than
protracted litigation.
Besides timeliness concerns, there are several efficiency-based
advantages that arise from mandatory and automatic judicial re-
view. For instance, automatic review will relieve some of the burden
on the judiciary. "Litigation is now an expected appendage to the
process. The adoption of a new set of districts is now often fol-
lowed by the bloody combatants heading off to the courthouse to
continue their battle.' 48 Automatic review preempts this litigation
by taking the plan straight to the institution with final approval. If
state litigation regarding redistricting makes its way to the state's
highest court, automatic review takes out the intervening appellate
steps. Some may argue that such review removes the voter from a
144. The Colorado Constitution only mandates that "[i]f the plan is approved by the
court, it shall be filed with the secretary of state for implementation no later than March 15
of the second year following the year in which the census was taken." COLO. CONST. art. V,
§ 48.
145. Id.
146. See supra Part III.A.
147. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
148. Richard L. Engstrom, The Post-2000 Round of Redistricting: An Entangled Thicket
Within the Federal System, PUBLIus, Fall 2002, at, 51, 56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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process that implicates her fundamental rights. However, auto-
matic review does not eliminate the opportunity for the voter to
bring another challenge before the court, especially for a claim
that the court has not yet considered. Additionally, the voter never
loses the ability to bring a federal claim to federal district court and
thus, protection by the federal judiciary endures.'49
Automatic review not only unclogs the judiciary's docket, but
also saves a considerable amount of time and money. Persistent
litigation costs the taxpayers, the plaintiffs, and the court time and
money. Automatic review can relieve some of the costs of this proc-
ess. Additionally, the costs of such litigation can be severely
increased if the plan is invalidated by the court and the court or-
ders the commission to pay the plaintiffs' attorney fees. In the 2001
Arizona redistricting cycle, a federal district court found for the
plaintiffs and awarded attorneys' fees (that the AIRC and the Sec-
retary of State of Arizona were equally responsible for paying).'5°
Similarly, following the 2001 decennial redistricting in Alaska, the
Alaska Redistricting Board was ordered to pay the plaintiffs' attor-
ney fees.' 51 Alaska allocated $2.8 million of the state capital budget
to pay attorneys in the redistricting case. 5 2 Taxpayers' money can
be saved through the automatic review process. With the automatic
review process, there is no award of attorneys' fees because there is
no litigation.
Automatic judicial review by the state supreme court offers many
advantages to the state, the voter, the judiciary, and the redistrict-
ing process. Redistricting is a legislative power'53 and with the
creation of a redistricting commission, the legislature cedes its dis-
tricting power to this commission. Automatic state supreme court
review allows for the commission to complete this legislative task
without allowing the judiciary to redistrict. Furthermore, such
automatic review presents the state supreme court with a quintes-
149. Even if the state supreme court had held that federal law had been complied with,
the federal courts would likely not hold that the claim is barred by the doctrine of resjudi-
cata, because the party did not have a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the issue in the
state courts. SeeAllen v, McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-95 (1980).
150. Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 286 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1097
(D. Ariz. 2003). Although this decision was based on a federal statute, many states have simi-
lar statutes.
151. Alaska Digest, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 23, 2002, at B3.
152. Id.; see also Alaska Ear; The Divine Appendage, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 19,
2002, at B2 ("So far legal bills filed by challengers of the new redistricting plan add up to
$2.5 million. They mostly won, so they get to collect from the loser, meaning the Alaska
Redistricting Board, which is actually the state, which is actually you-know-who. This doesn't
count the approximately $500,000 in costs and fees for the board's attorneys. Ajudge gets to
review and revise before payment is made.").
153. See Wise, supra note 130, at 539-40.
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sential judicial task and restricts the judiciary from stepping be-
yond its institutional competence. Additionally, automatic state
supreme court review allows the voter to exercise his right to vote
in a timely election according to a constitutional redistricting map.
Finally, mandatory state supreme court review partially relieves
state courts of the litigation burden presented by the redistricting
process and provides for an efficient redistricting process.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has consistently "ground[ed] the legitimacy
of the exercise of governmental power in the fairness and propri-
ety of the electoral process itself. 15 4 Partisan gerrymandering
upends this democratic foundation by perverting the election
process and allowing the elected to pick their electors. However,
the courts continue to refuse to develop ajudicial solution to parti-
san gerrymandering. As a result, opponents of partisan
gerrymandering have looked for a solution elsewhere. One such
solution is the establishment of redistricting commissions, by which
the threat of partisan gerrymandering may be reduced. There are
several elements to a redistricting commission, including the
membership, the factors the commission must consider, and the
ratification process. This Note has argued that automatic judicial
review by the state supreme court is one of the necessary compo-
nents of a redistricting commission that mitigates the evils of
partisan gerrymandering.
Automatic judicial review by the state supreme court is a fairer,
more efficient, and more judicially-appropriate ratification mecha-
nism than ratification by state legislatures or no ratification at all.
Automatic judicial review can help to eliminate the problems pre-
sented by other ratification mechanism, including election delays,
high financial costs, and redistricting by the judiciary. However, the
ratification process on its own will not necessarily provide a less
partisan redistricting process or more competitive elections. Be-
cause judicial review must correspond to the statute creating the
commission, if the other elements of the redistricting commission
do not sufficiently eliminate partisan influences, then judicial re-
view cannot cure those problems.
The dangers of partisan gerrymandering will continue unabated
until a formidable solution can be crafted. Redistricting commissions
154. Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 605-06.
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present such a solution, but the effectiveness of such a commission
and the degree to which partisan influences are excised from the
process depends on how the commission is constructed.
Ratification by automatic state supreme court review is an essential
component in the creation of a redistricting commission and an
indispensable ingredient in the battle against partisan
gerrymandering.
